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ABSTRACT
The purpose of patent policy is to balance the incentive to
invent against the ability of the economy to utilize and incorporate
new inventions and innovations. Substandard patents that upset
this balance impose deadweight losses and other costs on the
economy. In this paper, we examine some of the deadweight losses
that result from granting substandard patents in the United States.
Under plausible assumptions, we find that the economic losses
resulting from the grant of substandard patents can reach $21
billion per year by deterring valid research with an additional
deadweight loss from litigation and administrative costs of $4.5
billion annually. This brings the total deadweight loss created by
our "dented" patent system to be at least $25.5 billion annually.
These estimates may be viewed as conservative because they do
not take into account other economic costs from our existing patent
system, such as the consumer welfare losses from granting
monopoly rents to patent holders that have not, in the end,
invented a novel product, or the full social value of the innovations
lost.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent policy necessarily involves a balance between
encouraging inventors to create new products while simultaneously
ensuring that innovations become diffused throughout the
economy. Protecting intellectual property is a lynchpin of a
vibrant, modem economy, and while the benefits of the patent
system are undeniable, the system also imposes significant cost on
the economy-even in the best of circumstances. Several high-
profile patent disputes, such as the Blackberry' and Microsoft
MP32 cases, have sparked a debate as to whether the U.S. patent
law system adequately promotes the interests of inventors or
whether the system is a legal quagmire that stalls new innovation
in excessive litigation.3 When a patent system grants substandard
patents or provides overly permissive legal remedies for patent
holders, the protection of intellectual property can create
substantial net loss of economic welfare. We envision a
"substandard patent" as one that is not privately profitable to
pursue in the absence of litigation opportunities afforded through
inevitable imperfections in the legal system. Although such a
patent does not protect an invention worth protecting from the
social point of view, they may be privately profitable because the
sometimes afford the opportunity to obtain payments from holders
1 The dispute between patent holder NTP Inc. and BlackBerry smartphone
manufacturer Research in Motion Ltd. resulted in a settlement of $612.5 million.
See Important Dates in BlackBerry Patent Case, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
11409695 (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (providing a detailed timeline of the case).
2 Saul Hansell, MP3 Patents in Upheaval After Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/23/technology/23patent.html.
3 For a summary of the ills of the modern patent system and critiques against it,
see ADAM JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS,
AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2004). As the National Research Council of the
National Academies noted, "patents on trivial innovations may confer market
power or allow firms to use legal resources aggressively as a competitive
weapon without consumer benefit." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L
ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 95 (2004).
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of sufficiently similar or related "real" patents which are practiced.
So, while a well-functioning patent system will necessarily balance
the benefits of innovation with the costs of monopoly, a defective
system adds to the social costs of patent monopolies the additional
deadweight losses arising from reduced innovation and from the
wasted resources directed at securing and protecting substandard
patents, without providing any offsetting benefit. In economic
terms, such substandard patents represent options permitting
transfers of wealth from the holders of legitimate patent rights to
those holding related, substandard patent claims. Their social value
is low (or zero), yet their private option value rises with defects in
the patent system.
The economic costs of substandard patents are highlighted
by (but by no means limited to) "patent troll" litigation, to which a
substandard patent regime can give rise. "Patent troll" litigation is
one form of litigation arbitrage-it will exist in areas in which
patents are relatively easy to obtain and the consequences to a
defendant accused of infringement of losing a patent suit can be
enormous and irreversible, such as an injunction against any future
sales of a successful yet potentially infringing product. The
presence of this arbitrage indicates that the current patent licensing
and enforcement system are in need of reform and a thoughtful
rebalancing of incentives.
In this Article, we attempt to quantify in a preliminary
manner a portion of the cost to the United States' economy of
substandard patents granted by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO). In particular, we focus upon
deadweight losses that result from the impact that a "loose" patent
system that unduly grants "substandard" patents has upon
innovation and the development of important, valid patents. These
costs are deadweight losses and not merely transfers, so they
reduce overall economic welfare. In the United States, we estimate
that the deadweight loss of a "loose" patent system from lost
innovation is approximately $21 billion each year in private costs
alone, or nearly $200 per household per year. This sizeable
deadweight loss constitutes approximately 7% of annual Research
and Development ("R&D") spending. Deadweight losses from
litigation and administrative costs from substandard patents
constitute an additional $4.5 billion annually, or 1.5% of the
country's annual R&D spending.
Our findings are described as preliminary, since there is
very limited data upon which to base our estimates. However, we
believe that our methods render conservative estimates because we
do not take into account a number of other costs created by
substandard patents. Most notably, in cases where a substandard
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innovating, there is a welfare loss without commensurate benefit
that our model does not attempt to quantify. We also ignore the
fact that innovation has a greater social benefit than private benefit,
so the social costs of lost innovation stand to be much larger than
the $21 billion in annual private costs from lost innovation that we
estimate.
4
In Part I, we provide a brief description of the general
problem of substandard patents and their causes and consequences.
Our discussion is succinct, since there are many studies on this
issue that are readily available to interested parties. In Part II, we
explain an important component of our model, which focuses on
the important interactions between the equilibrium level of "valid"
and "substandard" patents. We show that substandard patents
impose deadweight losses on the economy as a whole because they
deter innovation and the development of important, valid patents.
This idea serves as the basis for the estimation that we perform in
Part III. Part III also contains a sensitivity analysis to allow the
inputs to vary over the range of plausible values. Our findings are
summarized in the Conclusion.
I. SOURCES AND COSTS OF A "LOOSE" PATENT SYSTEM
A well-functioning patent system engages in a delicate
balance. In order to "promote the progress of Science and useful
Arts,"5 a patent holder is granted a legal exclusive monopoly to an
invention for a limited period of time. It is thought that granting
monopoly profits to patent holders would direct societal resources
towards scientific and useful innovations. Thomas Jefferson once
wrote that patent law is about "drawing a line between the things
which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive
patent and those which are not."
6
What Jefferson calls the "embarrassment" of a legal patent
monopoly, economists would call a social cost. By definition, the
granting of a monopoly reduces output and causes a net loss in
consumer welfare. The traditional justification for patent rights is
predicated upon the assumption that without such monopoly rights,
society will not achieve the optimal rate of innovation because
innovations and scientific discoveries are, absent patent rights,
often public goods that provide limited or no opportunity for the
4 See, e.g., Charles Jones & John Williams, Measuring the Social Return to R &
D, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1119 (1998); Adam Jaffe, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Economic Analysis of Research Spillovers Implications for the Advanced
Technology Program (Dec. 1996), http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/gcr708.htm.
5 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
6 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989)
(citing 13 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (Memorial ed. 1904)).
243
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inventor to recover the costs of discovery. If every invention could
be immediately copied, then few firms would invest the resources
necessary to invent new products. Absent patent rights, an inventor
also would have an incentive to prevent others from learning about
any new discovery.7 A patent attempts to remedy these problems
by giving the inventor the legal right to collect some portion of the
social value attributable to the invention while inducing disclosure
of the details of the invention to the public.8 This disclosure, in
turn, likely increases innovative activity in that area due to
increased information.
9
At the same time, granting too much protection to inventors
(or granting it too easily) can hamper the creation and diffusion of
technology throughout the economy. Achieving an adequate
balance of rights to compensate true innovators and fostering the
use of patented technology is the goal of a well-functioning patent
system. A patent regime that makes it too easy to obtain and
enforce a patent could create too many of these monopoly
"embarrassments" that would reduce economic welfare by virtue
of their monopoly status yet not promote economic welfare
because they do not reward true innovations.i° As the Supreme
Court stated in 1950, the granting of patents for obvious and
known methods "withdraws what is already known into the field of
its monopoly and diminishes the resources available to skillful
men."
11
There are several ways in which substandard patents can
impose economic and welfare costs on the economy. As we
describe in Part II below, a "loose" patent system-that is, a patent
system that permits large numbers of substandard patents-causes
deadweight economic losses because the presence of substandard
patents diminish the overall level of innovation and development
of valid patents. A valid patent, like a substandard patent, confers a
7 See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247-48 (1994).
8 Kitch adds that patents also promote efficiency by deterring others from
engaging in wastefully duplicative efforts of re-inventing the same technology.
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977); see also Dam, supra note 7, at 266-67.
9 There is some dispute regarding the value of disclosure. See, e.g., Yossi
Spiegel & Reiko Aoki, Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R&D, and
Welfare (Berglas Sch. of Econ. Working Paper No. 30-98, 1998).
10 See Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S.
Patent Reform, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (2002); Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie
Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting
in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-95, 32 RAND 101 (2001) (patenting
may be socially wasteful and accumulation of patents may redirect resources
away from productive research).
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monopoly right to the holder, but a valid patent does so only in the
case of genuine innovation. Valid patents then have a positive
social value in addition to a private value, while substandard
patents have only the private value. The deadweight losses
occasioned by substandard patents will cause resources to be
allocated inefficiently and therefore affect the entire economy. In
addition, a "loose" patent system that grants large numbers of
substandard patents also causes other inefficiencies and
misallocations of resources, as such a system would:
" Cause consumers to absorb monopoly prices over
"inventions" that were already effectively common
knowledge;
12
" Direct resources away from productive research and instead
towards strategic accumulation of patents already filed over
innovations already deployed;
13
" Divert resources to "defensive patenting" or securing
offensive "blocking patents;"'
14
" Direct research away from areas of existing patents that
should not have been granted;
15
" Direct resources toward acquiring and enforcing
substandard patents and collecting royalties rather than
productive fields of economic activity.
Given this potential for misallocating resources and the
other costs, a well-functioning patent law regime should tailor the
scope of the legal patent monopolies so that the harms described
above are outweighed by the benefit to society from the economic
innovation which results from those patent monopolies. As stated
by Ldvaque and Mdni~re, the "simple criterion" of economic
welfare "helps define the elements of an optimal patent."'
16
Whether the United States patent system is "too loose"
today is the subject of substantial debate. The claimed
shortcomings of the USPTO and the United States court system are
numerous and appear to stem primarily from a poor legal
12 "This deadweight loss reduces the total surplus created by the innovation at
least during the lifetime of the patent." FRANCOIS LIVtQUE & YANN M NIERE,
THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT 21 (2004).
13 Jaffe & Lerner describe a number of such activities including the sealed
crustless sandwich and the perpetual option pricing formula of Vergil
Daughtery. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 32, 145-47.
14 See Gallini, supra note 10 (describing strategic practice of "defensive
patenting"); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REv. 75 (1994)
(describing the similar strategic use of "blocking patents").
15 See Gallini, supra note 10.
16 LIVQUE & M1WNIItRE, supra note 12, at 43.
245
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framework and an understaffed and overworked agency. The
debate often centers around the patenting of "inventions" such as a
method for swinging on a swing, the sealed crustless sandwich, a
financial technique developed four decades prior to patenting by
academics unaffiliated with the patentee, and anti-gravity flying
machines. 17 As observed by Magliocca, the United States court
system, in many ways, exacerbates the problem, brought to light
by the explosion of "patent troll" litigation. Patent trolls engage in
a very specific arbitrage opportunity and thrive in certain
conditions in which patents are easy to obtain and keep, the costs
of defending a patent suit are great, and the risk to a defendant of
losing a patent suit are enormous because the defendant "cannot
easily substitute away from the disputed technology."' 18 Trolls
thrive in situations in which patents are easy to get and damages
uncertain. 19 As Justice Kennedy observed in the eBay decision, a
patent remedy such as a permanent injunction against an infringer
"can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to
companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent."
20
As a result, almost unique among industrialized nations,
United States companies face a plethora of patent suits brought by
plaintiffs with arguably substandard patents. 2 1 There are some
17 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 145-47; U.S. Patent No. 6,960,975 (filed
Mar. 14, 2005) (granting patent for a "space vehicle propelled by the pressure of
inflationary vacuum").
18 Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the
Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv 1809, 1812 (2007).
19 On the other hand, some commentators argue that "patent trolls" serve a
useful purpose, most notably by providing liquidity to inventors as well as
expertise in policing infringement. See, e.g., Steven Rubin, Hooray for the
Patent Troll, IEEE SPECTRUM, Mar. 2007, http://spectrum.ieee.org/consumer-
electronics/gaming/hooray-for-the-patent-troll ("[P]atent-holding companies
provide another way, and sometimes the only way, for an inventor to monetize
his patent. They foster innovation by making it possible for small companies and
individual inventors to spend their time in research and development, knowing
that if a patent does issue, they will not necessarily have to commercialize or
litigate it. They can spend time doing what they are good at-inventing."). But
see Zachary Roth, Patent Troll Menace, WASH. MONTHLY, June 1, 2005,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0506.rothsidebar2.html
("The reason this business is attractive to people such as Lockwood is simple:
Trolling makes money.... [E]ven though his patent was overturned, Lockwood
still got to keep the licensing fees he had extracted from other targets that chose
not to fight.").
20 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
21 Patent trolls are largely a U.S. phenomenon. See, e.g., Joe Brennan et al.,
Patent Trolls in the U.S., Japan, Taiwan and Europe, 13 CASRIP NEWSLETTER,
Spring/Summer 2006, http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/
default.aspx?year=2006&article=newsvl3i2BrennanEtAl. We do not claim that
most litigation by patent trolls is brought through substandard patents, only that
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signs that reform is brewing. Several recent Supreme Court
decisions have addressed the standards for granting and
challenging a patent22 and trimmed back lower court rulings that
had increased the business risk and harm from losing a patent
lawsuit.23 The Patent Reform Act of 2007, directed at improving
patent quality and changing patent remedies, has been approved by
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Analyzing and
understanding the economic welfare costs of the current United
States patent system is clearly of importance to policymakers as
they consider these reform proposals.
The welfare costs of the current United States patent
regime can be estimated empirically by comparing the valid patent
output of our regime to the patent system in Europe. In contrast to
the United States, the European patent system, while certainly not
perfect, has a relatively "tighter" standard for granting patents and
the process is administered and enforced differently as well. By
this discussion we do not mean to imply that the European patent
system is better than the United States system or that it should be
adopted here, but only to assert that the two legal regimes are
different in a way that allows us to perform an empirical analysis
of the current United States patent regime.
To obtain a patent in the United States, the invention must
be new, useful and non-obvious. 24 In the United States, unlike
some other countries, the process for granting a patent is usually
confidential and solely between the applicant and the USPTO, and
other parties are not permitted to intervene or oppose a patent
application. 25 Moreover, the USPTO cannot simply reject a patent
22 In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), the Court
tightened the Federal Circuit's test for patentability, in particular the "obvious"
standard. In Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007), the
Court overturned a Federal Circuit ruling that limited the ability of patent
licensees to subsequently challenge the validity of a patent.
23 In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007), the Court overturned
a Federal Circuit ruling that held Microsoft liable for computers manufactured
and programmed abroad with software that infringed a United States patent. In
eBay, the Court ruled that traditional equitable principles should apply in patent
disputes with regard to the granting of injunctions against infringing products;
prior to that decision, lower courts had followed a "general rule" of always
issuing such an injunction without considering the public interest.
24 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (new and useful); id. § 103 (non-obvious). For a
recent Supreme Court discussion of the obviousness test, see KSR, 550 U.S. 398.
25 Patent applications in the United States are not necessarily made public until
after a patent is issued. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a). Applications are not made public
until 18 months after filed. Id. § 122(b)(1)(A). Within two months after
publication, third parties may submit prior art related to patentability. Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure 1134.01. Upon issuances of a patent, the protection
has a term of twenty years from the date on which the application was filed, but
only upon issuance of a patent does the information disclosed in the application
becomes a matter of public record. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a). Until 1995, the term of a
247
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application; it also bears the burden of making a prima facie case
that explains the reasons for rejection. Third parties do not have the
right to participate in the patent application process and patents can
only be challenged after a grant in limited instances, consisting of
challenges based on prior art found in patents or printed
publications. 26 Moreover, in some instances, challenging a patent
creates potential for the challenger to be estopped from asserting
certain defenses in an infringement suit.27 Finally, in a suit for
patent infringement, a plaintiff may obtain injunctive relief and
damages, which may include lost profits due to the infringement or
a reasonable royalty.
28
Pursuant to the European Patent Convention, which
harmonizes the patent laws of its signatories, twenty-year patents
are available for "any inventions .. .provided that they are new
and which involve an inventive step and are susceptible of
industrial application." 29 The standard for patentability in Europe,
while similar to the United States in some respects, 30 is different in
other respects, particularly with regard to the European
requirement that an invention be of a "technical" nature. 31 In
addition, patent applications in Europe are made public even if
they have not been issued and the method for challenging a patent
differs. As a result, a patent application in Europe is three times
more likely to be opposed than a patent is to be reexamined in the
United States.32 Of all the potential remedies to the United States
patent system, remedying post-grant review process to adopt an
patent was seventeen years from the date of issuance. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1988)
(amended 1994).
26 35 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302, 311 (2006).
27Id § 315(c).
28 D.S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS 20.01, 20.03 (1997).
29 European Patent Convention art. 52(1), Nov. 29, 2000, available at
http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/html/epc/2000/e/contents.html.
30 Robert Stevenson, Software Patent Law: United States and Europe
Compared, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0006 (comparing U.S. "novelty" step to
European "new" step).
31 European Patent Convention, supra note 29, §§ 29(1), 52(2). This "technical
nature" requirement has led to different approaches in the United States and
Europe over the patentability of software and "business method" patents. The
European standard does permit the patenting of software directed at a technical
process or that contains non-technical features. See, e.g., In re Sohei, 1995
O.J.E.P.O. 525 (Tech. Bd. App. 1994), available at http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/biblio/t920769ep1 .htm.
32 LtVtQUE & MtNItRE, supra note 12; see also Dietmar Harhoff & Stuart J.H.
Graham et al., Patent Quality Control: A Comparison of US Patent Re-
examinations and European Patent Oppositions (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
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approach more consistent with the European Patent Office (EPO)
is by far the most commonly mentioned.33
Remedies for patent infringement are also different
between the United States and Europe, and these differences
appear to encourage more litigation in the United States. In
particular, European law tends to favor payment of license fees and
damages instead of injunctions over the future sale of infringing
products, which have been more common in the United States. For
example, in the United States, patent holders do not have a duty to
license and their licensing actions are limited only by antitrust
law, 34 but in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany,
compulsory license statutes require patent holders to license their
products. 35 While the Supreme Court in 2006 took action to limit
the scope of permanent injunctions in patent disputes, 36 injunctive
relief is still available to patent holders in the United States.37 Jury
trials to enforce patent rights and establish damages are not
guaranteed in Europe as they are in the United States. In the United
States, patent litigators often get a second bite of the apple as well,
33 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1455, 110th Cong. § 6. There are a
number of papers offering options to improve the current patent system,
primarily to protect against opportunism using substandard patents. See, e.g.,
David Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-
Grant Review, 2005 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 0009 (proposing that all patents be
reviewed openly "whenever patents are renewed or sold"); James Bessen &
Michael Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical Research on Patent
Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1, 1-27 (2005); J. Farrell & Robert
Merges, Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't
Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 1-28 (2004); Michael Meurer, Controlling
Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L.
REv. 509, 509-44 (2003); Stuart Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, Can Post-Grant
Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European
Patents (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5680, 2006); Stuart Graham & Dietmar
Harhoff, Would the U.S. Benefit from Patent Post-grant Reviews? Evidence
from a 'Twining' Study (June 2005), ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-
docs/veranstaltungen/graham harhoff paper.pdf.
34 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
179 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35 Stevenson, supra note 30, at 10.
36 In the eBay decision, the Court reversed the court of appeals' "general rule"
unique to patent disputes "that a permanent injunction will issue once
infringement and validity have been adjudged." eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006). According to Chief Justice Roberts, "[f]rom at
least the early 19th century, courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding
of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases." Id. at 394 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
37 TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Comm. Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
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because the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
reviews all patent claim determinations under a de novo standard.38
Patent suits in the United States are also generally more
expensive than in Europe. Estimates indicate that the costs of a
patent lawsuit through discovery are about $2 million for each
side.39 These costs are substantially higher than that in several
European countries. In Germany, for example, the cost of a suit
ranges from approximately $30,000 to $80,000. o
We outline these differences between the European and
United States patent regimes not to imply that the European regime
is somehow preferable to the United States system, but simply to
demonstrate how the United States system maintains a relatively
"looser" patent system than Europe, thereby permitting more
substandard patents. (The looseness of the patent system is
logically separate from the costs of litigating patent claims, yet the
high costs evident in the United States may strengthen the hand of
patent trolls in pretrial negotiations.) That distinction is important
as it serves as the basis for our estimation of deadweight losses and
other costs described in Part III below. As described below, a
"loose" patent system discourages the development and filing of
valid patents and creates a deadweight loss for the economy. We
base this estimate on the fact that even with a tighter legal standard
for patentability, Europe produces a higher share of "valid"
patents, relative to substandard patents, than the United States.
Therefore, while the European system has been criticized as being
too "tight," its relatively more stringent granting practices allow it
to serve as a basis for our estimation approach.
II. THE EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF VALID AND
SUBSTANDARD PATENTS
The basis of our argument is that substandard patents
arising from a "loose" patent system reduce the number of valid
patents by discouraging innovation. While this idea is generally
accepted, we formalize it here by describing the "correct" level of
patenting in the sense of the equilibrium values of valid and
substandard patents. To begin, we divide total patents into two
38 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en
banc). District Court Judge James F. Holderman stated that because of this de
novo standard of review in patent cases, "we United States District Court Judges
feel like the late comedian Rodney Dangerfield, because our opinions 'get no
respect."' James F. Holderman, The Patent Litigation Predicament in the United
States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 6.
39 See, e.g., John Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 441 (2003)
(estimating this figure for patents worth $1 to $25 million).
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types: (1) valid patents (v) and (2) substandard patents (b). Total
patents are just v + b. Valid patents represent patents that are true
inventions or discoveries in which the cost to society of granting a
twenty-year monopoly to the patent holder are outweighed by the
aggregate social benefit of the invention or discovery itself.
Substandard patents are those which are granted that are of low
quality (that is, for ideas that are not in fact new or non-obvious)
and which create risks for valid patents through litigation and
licensing. From the standpoint of our model, it is not necessary to
assume that each and every patent of this sort is literally bogus, is
created for a nefarious purpose, or is of no independent private
value to the patentee. Our analysis simply assumes that such
patents fall below an operative or ideal standard for approval and
that they impose, on average, a harm to the economy as a whole
and, specifically, a harm to so-called valid patents. More directly,
the addition of a substandard patent reduces the private marginal
benefit of a valid patent, and discourages the production of both
valid and substandard patents (or inventions in general, whether
patented or not).
The relationships between the flows of valid and
substandard patents, and the assumed forms of the marginal
benefits of these activities among agents in the economy, lie at the
heart of our analysis, and therefore merit a brief discussion. First,
valid patents, although they are differentiated by definition, are
assumed here to be, broadly speaking, "competing" with one
another. In other words, a valid invention will, on average, make
money for its owner, but the product or service supported by the
invention in question competes for the consumers' attention with
all other products offered in the market. In a market populated by
many innovative products, any individual product is, on average,
less likely to make a high return. Thus we assume, as is common in
economic analysis, that the marginal benefit of an additional valid
patent decreases as more valid patents are awarded. This feature of
the return to innovative activity is also consistent with the
observation that high value projects are pursued "first", i.e., in
almost all cases, while lower valued projects are funded only under
more favorable conditions. The same logic applies to the
diminishing marginal values of substandard patents.
The notion that increased numbers of valid patents will
increase the marginal value of a substandard patent arises from the
conceptualization of a substandard patent. Such a patent has value
primarily (or solely) from its potential to support a patent claim
against a valid, profitable patent. The more valid patents there are,
the greater the probability such a claim can be constructed given an
arbitrary substandard patent. Thus, the holder of a substandard
patent would welcome increased numbers of valid patents, as this
12
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would raise her opportunity for privately profitable litigation. In a
similar way, an increase in the number of substandard patents will
adversely affect the expected profitability of a valid patent, since
the risk of costly patent claims will increase.
To describe the equilibrium, we assume that patents (or
patentable inventions) are ordered from highest to lowest, with
resources devoted first to those patents with the greatest value.
With diminishing marginal benefits to patents, the equilibrium
number of valid patents, v*, will solve:
A(x) -a v-c b =0 (1)
where the expression is the net private marginal benefit of an
additional valid patent.4 1 The total benefit of valid patents is
maximized where the marginal benefit of a valid patent is zero.
The net marginal benefit includes a value A(x), which is a function
of exogenous factors x such as the legal system for granting or
challenging patents and the cost of enforcing patents. The
parameter a measures the reduction in the net marginal benefit of
valid patents given the addition of one more valid patent, and the
negative sign indicates diminishing marginal benefits.42 The
relationship between the number and creation of substandard
patents and the marginal value of a valid patent is measured by the
parameter c. Substandard patents, on the other hand, reduce the net
marginal benefit of valid patents. This consequence arises
primarily from opportunistic litigation or licensing. Although they
both represent a reduction in the value of a valid patent, both a and
c are expressed as positive values.
The equilibrium number of substandard patents, b*, will
solve:
B(y) - d b + e v =0 (2)
where B(y) is a scale factor for the net private marginal benefit of
substandard patents, and its value is driven by a set of factors y.
The factors y will generally not be the same as x, but some overlap
is to be expected. Intuitively, y will encompass factors that
measure the strength of the jurisdictional patent review process, the
efficiency of the legal system, the generosity of patent
41 In both Equation (1) and Equation (2), we have linear marginal benefits, but
this assumption is not required and is for convenience only.
42 This reduction in marginal benefit presumably occurs because patent
opportunities are exploited in order of decreasing expected net value, although
the formulation is not inconsistent with the existence of an additional effect that
reflects an actual reduction in the economic value due to competition between
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infringement awards, legal costs, and so on. The parameter d is the
effect on net private marginal benefits from the addition of one
more substandard patent. And while d is positive, the negative sign
implies diminishing net marginal benefits. In contrast to Equation
(1), an increase in the number of valid patents increases the net
private marginal benefit of a substandard patent (because this
increase creates more opportunities for litigation). The equilibrium
number of both types of patents is determined by the condition that
the marginal benefits of each are simultaneously equal to zero in
the relevant jurisdiction.
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the equilibrium.
The figure has the number of substandard patents (b) on the
vertical and valid patents (v) on the horizontal axis. The curves in
the figures represent the loci of points where the marginal benefits
of valid and substandard patents equal zero across the range of
values of both b and v (i.e., iso-marginal benefit curves). The
intersection of the two defines the equilibrium. In the figure, the





Figure 1. Patent Equilibrium
To demonstrate the comparative statics of the model,
consider a court decision that makes the granting of substandard
patents more difficult, such as the recent Supreme Court decision
in KSR that overturned lower court's permissive interpretation of
the "non-obvious" test for patentability. In the model, this legal
change is represented by a change in y that reduces B(y).
Consequently, the number of substandard patents should diminish.
In Figure 2, we illustrate this as a change in y to y', causing a shift
in the upward sloping iso-marginal benefit curve for substandard
patents down and to the right. The new equilibrium is b** and v**,
253
14
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 12 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol12/iss1/6
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 240 (2010)
where substandard patents fall and valid patents rise. Given our
observation above that substandard patents diminish the value of
valid patents and, therefore, reduce the incentive for firms to obtain
such valid patents, upon the legal change that decreases the
number of substandard patents, the number of valid patents will be
expected to rise.
The comparative statics of the other parameters are
similarly intuitive. Put simply, anything that increases the value of
valid patents increases both b and v. Any change that increases the
value of substandard patents reduces v and increases b. For
example, a change in x that makes valid patents more difficult to
enforce will shift the iso-marginal benefit curve (MBV = 0) down





b* . . . . /
I MB =O0
V* V ** V
Figure 2. Patent Equilibrium
The most important point about this analysis is that it
illustrates an aspect of the problem of the United States patent
system that has received insufficient attention. In particular, since
the numbers of both types of patents affect the marginal values of
each, any policy change that affects either relationship will, in
equilibrium, affect the numbers of both types. Of special potential
concern is the size of the effect of substandard patents on the
values of valid patents. To the degree that valid patents, as
described here, have much larger net social values, a patent system
that allows too many substandard patents is likely to reduce the
extent of innovation valid patents support, reducing economic
welfare. This dampening effect may be far more important than the
direct costs of litigation and licensing, much of which will
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de minimis, the discouragement of innovation, in the long run, will
almost certainly swamp these more easily counted "direct" costs.
We also note that the underpinnings to our approach are
conceptual. For example, we note that there is no need to assume
that the socially optimal number of substandard patents need be
zero, especially because there are costs associated with reducing
substandard patents. For instance, adopting a patent regime that
sets the bar high for granting any patent would certainly reduce or
even eliminate the level of substandard patents, but that decision
also could reduce the number of valid patents as well and therefore
impose welfare losses on the economy. The administrative costs
(and risk of mistakes) of sorting through valid and substandard
patents may also be extraordinarily high. Like most things in
economics and public policy, such a complete foreclosure of
substandard patents would probably be too costly to be optimal in
the real world. As a result, the efficient balance should be sought,
and that appropriate balance is what a good patent policy must
continually strive to achieve.
In addition, we are not assuming, and do not suggest, that
substandard patents are intentionally created to use in
opportunistic, socially destructive litigation or royalty seeking. It
seems probable that very few patents are created with that primary
end in mind. Rather, when the patent system is sufficiently "loose"
in granting patents, and patents are had cheaply enough, firms and
others will patent devices and procedures that are of limited
commercial potential. In such cases, the possibility of obtaining an
infringement award, or of licensing to others seeking legal defense,
becomes a non-negligible consideration that encourages the
patentee to proceed. Such expectations, of course, need to be
accurate in equilibrium, so it must be the case that some
opportunistic exploitation occurs. Since a patent is often an
alternative to other means of protecting intellectual property, such
as trade secret activity, one would expect that an increase in the
number of potentially threatening patents would reduce the
marginal benefit of a "valid" patent effort.
III. QUANTIFYING THE COSTS OF SUBSTANDARD PATENTS
As discussed above, the presence of substandard patents
leads to a reduction in the number of valid patents. In this Part, we
attempt to quantify the loss of valid patents in the United States
due to substandard patents, and then put a monetary value on that
loss. As a first step, we estimate the number of valid patents lost to
substandard patents. To do so, we assume, as have others, that
triadic patents-i.e., those in which the inventor seeks patent
protection in the United States, Europe, and Japan-are "relatively
255
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important" patents and are, to a large extent, generally regarded as
"valid" patents.43 The validity of such patents is based on the fact
that the patent must be granted by three patent offices: the USPTO,
the EPO, and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO). By most accounts,
the EPO is the most stringent in its requirements and evaluations,
and we use that presumption below to specify some parameters of
our estimation approach. We do not intend, however, to imply that
the European patent system is the "correct" system. Rather, we
assume, given the differences in the legal regime, that patents
issued by the EPO are less likely to be substandard patents. This
assumption, however, does not imply that the EPO system is in
some sense ideal or perfect.
It is of course arguable that U.S. patents are, in some sense,
qualitatively different from those in the European Union or Japan.
This could be the case, for example, if the U.S. market were more
important because of its size or profitability. Then, one might
imagine valid inventions being patented only in the U.S. However,
we find this conjecture unconvincing for several reasons. First, it
seems unlikely one would have a patent for an invention that was
profitable in the United States, but not in the European Union, for
example. It is easier to imagine a profitable invention patented
only in Japan, where cultural practices and relative prices are quite
different (for example, it seems likely that a golf driving range
device meant to be used atop tall buildings would be of more value
in Japan). One might refer to this possibility as the "enculturation"
of inventive activity.
More importantly, however, it seems undeniable that triadic
patents are highly likely to be important, valid patents, even if
there are valid patents that are not registered in all three
jurisdictions. In this case, variations in the rates of triadic patents
between jurisdictions will still provide a relative measure of lesser
quality patents, although perhaps not universally substandard ones.
Then, looking at the high rate of patents granted in the United
States relatively to U.S. investment in R&D, one is forced to
conclude either that: (1) the United States is highly efficient in
R&D given its investments, or (2) the U.S. system generates a
large number of dubious patents relative to the other jurisdictions.
We base our calculations on the second of these interpretations.
Substandard patents are harmful in (at least) three
respects. 44 First, substandard patents may reduce future innovation
43 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 143.
4 4 See, e.g., U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 146-151, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/report/gc vl.pdf (2003); Richard Levin et al.,
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&D, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
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by discouraging research and development in a particular area for
fear of infringing, or directing research away from valid to
substandard opportunities. 45 This reluctance to enter could affect
market structure and prices. Second, substandard patents may
induce unnecessary licensing royalties, distorting the incentives the
patent system was designed to provide. Third, legal challenges to
substandard patents can result in socially wasteful litigation costs.
Our focus here is on the first harm, and we attempt to estimate the
welfare losses from high numbers of substandard patents. We
believe these costs will be the largest of the three, and our rough
estimates of the other costs indicate that this is true.
A. Lost Patents
The presence of substandard patents clearly reduces the
incentives for firms to innovate. 46 Yet, there is no direct evidence
of which we are aware on the precise extent of research deterrence.
In an effort to approximate the number of lost "valid" or
"relatively important" patents lost due to the presence of
substandard patents, we assume the production of relatively
important patents is a linear function of R&D expenditures.47 Thus,
45 See, e.g., Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is
It the Best Incentive System?, 2 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 51 (2002); Robert
Merges & Richard Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
46 Jean Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary
Injunctions, 44 J.L. & ECON. 573 (2001); Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow
of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1995). Hunt claims that the weakening of
the non-obviousness requirement by domestic courts lead to more but weaker
patents, and discouraged R&D activity. Robert Hunt, Nonobviousness and the
Incentive To Innovate: An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Reform
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Working Paper No. 99-3, 1999); see also T.S.
Ellis, Judge, Distortion of Patent Economics by Litigation Costs, Address at the
1999 CASRIP Summit Conference, in 5 CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES:
STREAMLINING INT'L INTELL. PROP. 22 (1999), available at http://www.law.
washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number5/pub5atcl3.pdf. ("My thesis today
is neither revolutionary nor abstruse. On the contrary, it is no more than a
modest, straightforward, common-sensical observation that has likely already
occurred to many veteran viewers of the patent scene. It is, simply put, that the
escalating, indeed skyrocketing litigation costs of the 1970's and 1980's have
distorted patent markets and patent economics. Put another way, it is my
observation that the escalating costs associated with litigating patent
infringement and validity issues discourage challenges to patents, thereby
essentially equating the entry barriers for presumptively valid, but weaker
patents with those entry barriers associated with strong or judicially tested
patents.").
47 We are also evaluating log transformations of the variables using comparable
R 2 values, but the linear specification is superior to these alternatives.
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the number of triadic patents filed by country i in period t is
described by
T
Fi,t = RNDi,t + O DUS + ;_ ajDj + i,t (3)
where F is the number of triadic family patents for country i in
period t, RND is the real research and development expenditures
for country i in period t, DUS is a dummy variable with a value of
1 for the United States (0 otherwise), the Dj are T (= Xt) period
specific dummy variables, the cy are estimated coefficients, and Ejj
is the econometric disturbance term.48 The coefficient 0 measures
the extent to which the United States either under- or over-
produces valid patents relative to other countries. Triadic patents
are measured by the OECD using applications at the EPO and JPO
and grants at the USPTO.49
All of the data required to estimate Equation (3) is from the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's
(OECD) Main Science and Technology Indicators. The variables
are expressed in annual terms and cover the period 1995 through
2003. The variable RND is measured in two ways: civil R&D and
total R&D (both civil and defense), and both are measured in real
dollars (in millions).50 There is some evidence suggesting that
defense spending on R&D generates few patents, and the United
States spends far more on defense R&D than any other country in
the sample.51 Thus, using only Civil R&D (i.e., total R&D less
defense-related R&D) provides a more conservative estimate of the
number of lost valid patents. To demonstrate the conservative
nature of using only Civil R&D expenditures, we also present the
results with the variable R&D measured using total R&D
expenditures for comparison purposes. Given the large number of
missing observations on the share of Civil R&D spending, the
48 Data required to estimate this equation is from the OECD's Main Science and
Technology Indicators (Subscription Service). The variables are expressed in
annual terms and cover the period 1995 through 2003, and with missing
variables the sample size is 299 observations. The model is estimated using least
squares with period dummy variables to account for the time series nature of the
data. The coefficients are highly statistically significant and are 13o = -396.6, 131
= 0.10, and the year 2003 constant is -105.2. Overall, the model performs well,
with an R2 of 0.80. The linear specification fits the data quite well, much better
than either the log-lin or log-log specifications.
49 Application data at the USPTO was not available prior to 2003, leading to this
definition of triadic patents by the OECD. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV. [OECD], PATENT STATISTICS MANUAL 71 (2009).
50 The GDP deflator is provided in the OECD data for those countries included
in the sample.
51 Aok Chakrabarti & C. Leonard Anyanwu, Defense R&D, Technology, and
Economic Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis of the U.S. Experience, 40
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share variable is assumed to be constant over the sample period
(based on the average of available data). We do not suspect this
will bias the results significantly, since the available data suggests
the civil share across all countries is very stable over time.
The OECD data provides data on thirty-eight countries,
although there are some missing observations. We present the
results of the estimation using three sets of countries. Sample A
includes thirty countries with 227 total observations. 53 This sample
includes all countries for which the necessary data is available. For
Sample B, we include only countries in the European Union and
the United States, since the patent and legal regimes in these
countries are more likely consistent with that of the United
States. 54 Finally, in Sample C, we include all thirty-eight countries
available.55 In this sample, however, we are limited to total R&D
expenditures in nominal terms due to a lack of data. The results
from this sample are provided for illustrative purposes only, and
we do not discuss them in detail.
The model is estimated using least squares with period
dummy variables to account for the time series nature of the data.
56
Table 1 summarizes the results. Alternative procedures for
computing the standard errors render no significant changes, so the
t-statistics are based on the ordinary standard errors. All the
variables are statistically significant. The model fits the data very
well, with R2 values of about 0.97 across all specifications (except
for Sample C, with an R2 of 0.92). The good fit is not surprising
given the time series component of the data.
Turning to the number of lost patents (measured by 0 in
Equation (3)), across Samples A and B we observe similar
estimates when using Civil R&D expenditures. The more
conservative number, and probably the more sensible one given the
comparison is across the United States and EU countries only, is
52 For every year the data is available, we compute the ratio of Civil to Total
R&D (as a percentage of GDP), and then average these for each country.
53 We have 30 countries and 9 years of data for a total of 270 potential
observations, but there are missing values. The countries in Sample A include
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United
Kingdom, and United States.
54 The countries in Sample B include Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway,
Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovenia, United
Kingdom, and United States.
55 Thus, Sample C includes all countries listed supra note 53, plus Canada,
China, Hungary, Israel, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, and Turkey.
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7266 triadic patents, with 90% confidence interval boundaries of
6205 and 8327 [se(O) = 642.7]. In the larger Sample A, lost patents
rises to 8447, with a 90% confidence interval bound by 7715 to
9181.
For both samples, the estimate of lost triadic patents is
larger when using total R&D expenditures (12,004 and 9406,
respectively). This difference and its direction were expected,
given the higher percentage of defense related expenditures in the
U.S. and the low patent productivity of such expenditures. To be
conservative, we assume there are 7000 lost triadic patents due to
the presence of substandard patents in the United States, a round
number that is at the lower end of our approximation technique
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Table 1. Estimation of Lost Patents, Regression Results
Sample A Sample B Sample C
Variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(t- stat) (t- stat) (t- stat) (t- stat) (t- stat)
Constant -404.35 -417.79 -249.60 -211.30 -332.20
(-8.23) (-7.14) (-4.63) (-3.51) (-4.89)
RND 0.123 ... 0.115
(Civil R&D) (60.19) (36.44)
RND ... 0.117 ... 0.105
(Total R&D) (50.19) (32.00)
RND ... ... ... ... 0.103
(Nominal Total) (35.50)
DUS -8447.96 -12003.74 -7266.10 -9405.96 -8445.48
(-19.01) (-20.18) (-11.30) (-11.82) (-11.29)
Period Constants
1995 -73.18 -65.06 18.02 30.49 154.68
1996 -24.38 -13.81 50.41 63.51 151.71
1997 50.93 53.62 63.11 67.97 135.30
1998 4.39 5.69 -5.49 -1.89 67.73
1999 101.16 102.23 24.40 19.89 82.75
2000 51.45 45.43 -1.93 -10.63 -10.12
2001 -9.92 -16.89 -55.26 -64.45 -109.85
2002 -67.83 -71.36 -50.51 -52.54 -213.70
2003 -37.68 -43.37 -43.92 -52.56 -234.70
R2  0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.92
Cross Sections 30 30 19 19 38
Observations 227 227 148 148 299
Of course, a patent can be valid without being triadic (but
we are assuming triadic patents are valid), since not all valid
patents are worth filing triadically. As an approximation to the
number of valid to triadic patents, we assume that more rigorous
standards of the EPO render only valid patents (we relax this
assumption later in our estimation procedure). The (average) ratio
of valid patents to triadic patents can be approximated by
T
Pit = ;k. "Fi + ai- xDi + 6i't  (4)
where Pit is the number of patent applications by country i in
period t. Equation (4) is estimated in the same way as Equation (3)
with period dummies Dj. Sample B is used since it includes only
EU countries (18 countries, 162 observations). The k coefficient is
estimated to be 3.0 (t-stat = 120.3). 57 So, the ratio of total valid
patents to triadic patents in a jurisdiction is approximately 3.0.
Triadics are measured in terms of grants by the USPTO rather than
57 The R2 of the model is 0.99.
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applications as in the case of the EPO and JPO. Given X = 3 and a
loss of 7,000 triadic patents due to the presence of substandard
patents in the United States, both estimated above, the total loss of
valid patents in the United States per year is estimated to be 21,000
patent grants (about 10% of patents granted annually by the
USPTO).58 Over the period 1999 through 2003, applications in the
US exceeded grants by about two-fold, so there is approximately a
loss of about 40,000 applications for valid patents.
59
Assuming, for illustrative purposes, a 20% leakage in the
EPO of substandard patents, reducing X to 2.4, we have 16,800 lost
valid patents in the United States annually due to the research
deterrence effects of substandard patents. If the EPO is too
stringent, say leading to the rejection of 20% of valid patents filed,
then X is 3.6 and lost U.S. valid patents is approximated by 25,200.
We can also vary the assumed loss of triadic patents, perhaps
according to the estimated confidence interval, for even more
approximations of the total loss of valid patents in the United
States. Given the imprecise nature of all of these calculations, we
believe it is prudent to consider a range of options when estimating
the welfare loss from substandard patents.
Having set forth a method for determining the number of
lost patents, the next step requires an estimate of how much each
patent is worth. There exists a substantial literature on the
economic value of patents. For our purposes, the most useful
estimate is by Cockburn and Griliches, who estimate the average
economic value of a patent as US$1 million (in current dollars) or
$2.4 million adjusting for both inflation and economic growth.6'
Certainly, the distribution of value is highly skewed, but for our
calculations the average is suitable. To be conservative, for the
benchmark case we assume an average value per valid patent of $1
million, and we will also consider a range of potential values.
The calculation of the deadweight welfare loss from
substandard patents is
DWL = X " PsT " VvAUD (5)
58 Estimated according to OECD's Main Science and Technology Indicators.
59 USPTO, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2008,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/usstat.htm.
60 lain Cockburn & Zvi Griliches, Industry Effects and Appropriability Measures
in the Stock Market's Valuation of R&D and Patents, 78 AM. ECON. REV.:
PAPER & PROC. 419 (1988) (providing a per-patent estimate of value).
61 Id. We use the consumer price index to convert the year 1980 estimate of
$500,000 to current dollars (258 in 1980 to 604 in 2006), and for economic
growth we include the growth in GDP over the same period. These data are
available at U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Economy Analysis,
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where PLOST is lost valid patents and VVALID is the average value of
a valid patent. In our benchmark case, we have
D WL = 3" 7,000" 1,000,000 = 21,000,000,000 (6)
so our "point" estimate of the deadweight loss from substandard
patents is $21 billion annually. Given annual R&D expenditures in
this US of about $300 billion, these losses represent about 7% of
total R&D spending per year.
We do not wish to exaggerate the precision of our
estimation approach. A rudimentary sensitivity analysis seems
unnecessary given the simple form of the damage calculations (in
Equation (5)). For example, if we assume any of the inputs to the
calculation is understated by 10%, then the estimated cost
increases by 10%.
We do think a simulation approach that estimates a
distribution of plausible values may be useful. In this simulation,
we take our "point" estimates of the three inputs to Equation (5) as
mean values, and allow each to vary according to a specified
distribution. From the econometric estimate of PLOST, we observed
a coefficient of variation of about 0.10 (i.e., standard error of the
coefficient divided by the mean). For our simulation, then, we
assume that PLOST is distributed normally with mean 7000 and
standard deviation 700. We also assume that VVALID is distributed
normally also with a coefficient of variation of 0.10 (so the 95%
confidence interval is 0.8 million to 1.2 million). For k, we also
assign a coefficient of variation of 0.1, and this choice renders a
95% confidence interval bound by 2.4 and 3.6. Our simulation
includes 10,000 draws of random numbers from these
distributions, and these numbers are inserted into Equation (5) to
compute the cost of substandard patents. The resulting distribution
is illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 is the histogram of welfare costs of substandard
patents from the simulation. The simulated mean of costs ($20.989
billion) is essentially equal to the $21 billion from Equation (6), as
expected. The standard deviation is about $3.6 billion (about 17%
of the mean). The distribution has a slight positive skew, so it is
not symmetrical. Repeating the simulation 100 times indicates the
upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval are $14.4
billion and $28.7 billion.62 For this particular simulation, the
minimum value is about $10 billion and the maximum about $38
billion.63 We stress, however, that these calculations are illustrative
since the nature of the random process is somewhat arbitrary. But,
even with wide variation in the benchmark assumptions, the
estimate of cost remains very high even at its smallest value ($10
billion annually).
B. Other Deadweight Losses
As mentioned above, we suspected that the research
deterrence costs would be the largest of the deadweight losses from
a loose patent system. There are, however, other costs. One direct
cost of substandard patents relates to the typical administrative
costs of pursuing substandard patents including legal fees,
application fees, and the cost of the USPTO. These costs are
62 This confidence interval is not symmetric around the mean (-6.6 billion and
+7.7 billion).
63 Given the very large number of simulations, the minimum, maximum, and
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deadweight losses. In the United States, the legal and filing fees
are estimated to be a few thousand dollars for even a simple patent
to upwards of $25,000 for more complex technologies. Offered
estimates of costs from a variety of sources typically fall in the
$3000 to $25,000 range per application.64 For our computations,
we assume that the patent application costs $7500, on average, in
legal and administrative fees.
65
These costs must be applied to some estimate of the
number of substandard patents filed each year. According to
OECD data, over the five-year period 1999 through 2003, there
were 90,445 triadic patents filed from the United States (recall that
66triadic patents are counted by grants for the USPTO). From
above, we estimated the ratio of valid patents to triadic patents to
be 3.0.67 Applying our k to the United States, we would expect that
there would be approximately 271,335 valid patent grants in the
United States over this period. However, there were 594,827
patents granted the USPTO in this period, which suggests that
approximately half of all U.S. patents granted are substandard.68
While this percentage of substandard patents is high, it is
consistent with other evidence. For example, Graham and Harhoff
calculate that about 40% of U.S.-granted patents are rejected by the
EPO, though the number is found to be much lower (about 4%) in
Jensen et al.69 Not all United States patents are also filed at the
64 Gene Quinn, Cost of Obtaining a Patent, IPWatchdog.com, Dec. 31, 2007,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/patent/patent-cost. On average, the USPTO's
average cost per patent reviewed is about $4000. See also Techtransfer, Univ. of
Mich., Patents and Other Legal Protection, http://www.techtransfer.umich.edu/
resources/inventors/patents.php (last visited Apr. 9, 2010); What Does It Cost
To Obtain a Patent, http://www.basicpatents.com/patcost.htm (last visited Apr.
9, 2010); You Want To Be an Inventor, http://www.inventored.org/novice (last
visited Apr. 9, 2010); Cost of a Patent, http://www.costhelper.com/cost/small
-business/patent.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). In some cases, patent
prosecution costs must be incurred which could increase the cost by another
$5000 to $15,000. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FY 2006 PERFORMANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT app. A, at 316 (2006), http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/
Budget/06APPR/PAR06.pdf.
65 Over the period 2003 through 2005, the USPTO earned about $3.3 billion in
revenue from 1.14 million applications, for an average application cost of about
$3000. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2006 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS (2006).
66 Estimated according to OECD's Main Science and Technology Indicators.
67 For that same period, European countries (EU25) filed 79,295 triadic patents
and 250,275 applications at the EPO. Thus, dividing the two, we compute a X of
3.16, which is very close to our estimated k of 3.0.
68 Estimated according to OECD's Main Science and Technology Indicators.
69 Paul H. Jensen et al., Disharmony in International Patent Office Decisions, 15
FED. CTR. BAR J. 679, 690 (2006); Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff,
Separating Patent Wheat from Chaff: Would the U.S. Benefit from Adopting a
Patent Post-Grant Review? (Oct. 14, 2009), http://ssm.com/abstract=1489579.
265
26
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 12 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol12/iss1/6
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 240 (2010)
EPO (U.S. entities file about 15% as many applications annually at
the EPO as they do the USPTO), but one would initially think that
those filed at the EPO by American entities would be of relatively
high quality.70 Allison and Lemley, in a study of patents litigated
over the period 1989 through 1996, reveal that about half of
litigated patents are invalidated at trial y.7  Further, Trajtenberg
argues that cited patents, and not simple patent counts, are
correlated with patent value. In his data, about half of patents are
not cited, again suggesting that about half of patents may be
classified as substandard. 2 Finally, Jaffe and Lerner summarize
evidence from the OECD indicating that the growth rate of USPTO
granted patents is twice that of "economically significant" (or
triadic) patents.7 3
Assuming 50% of filings are substandard and there are
400,000 filings per year, there are about 200,000 substandard
patent filing at the USPTO annually.7 4 At an average cost of $7500
per application, the annual deadweight loss from administrative
costs related to the acquisition of substandard patents is $1.5
billion. While this is certainly a large number and a significant cost
of substandard patents, it is far below the costs of research
deterrence caused by substandard patents.
Substandard patents also lead to litigation. While
judgments are properly viewed as transfers, the costs of obtaining
judgments (or royalties) are deadweight losses. In order to
determine the expected cost of litigation from substandard patents,
we need an estimate of the probability a patent is litigated and the
cost of litigation. As for litigation rates, Lanjouw and Shankerman
find a domestic litigation rate of about 1.6% during the early
Grant rates are highly contested figures. See, e.g., Cecil Quillen & Ogden
Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent
Office, 11 FED. CTR. BAR J. 1 (2001) ("The Grant Rate (allowances divided by
total disposals, i.e., the sum of allowances and abandonments) for the USPTO
for its fiscal years 1993-1998, corrected for continuing applications, ranges from
87% to 97%, depending on the extent to which prosecution of abandoned
applications was continued in re-filed applications. Reported Grant Rates for
1995-1999 for the European and Japanese Patent Offices (averaged) are 67%
and 64%, respectively.").
70 FOUR OFFICE STATISTICS REPORT fig. 4.2, at 41 (2008), http://www.trilateral.
net/statistics/tsr/statisticsreport/fullreport.pdf.
71 John Allison & Mark Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 185, 205 (1998).
72 Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value
of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON. 172, 181 (1990).
73 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 3, at 143.
74 Our statistical analysis is based, by necessity, on grants for the USPTO.
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1980s. 75 Allison et al. report a 3.2% litigation rate.76 The litigation
rate from these studies depend on a number of things including the
stock of patents and time period evaluated.
For our purposes, we are constructing annual estimates of
the cost of substandard patents. Federal statistics indicate that there
are approximately 3000 patent cases filed annually. Allison et al.
show that most litigated patents are younger, typically being three
years or less.77 Thus, we construct a patent stock of relatively
recent patents. Over the most recent five years for which there is
data (2004-2008), the USPTO has granted nearly one million
patents, so we assume the stock of patents is 1 million and
construct an annual litigation rate using that stock.78 So, a
reasonable proxy for the annual litigation rate is 0.3% (or 3 cases
per 1000 patents) on the stock of patents (both valid and
substandard).
The cost of litigation varies substantially across patents, but
the average is typically claimed to be in the $1 million to $4
million range for the discovery phase (about half the cost of a full
trial). 79 Allison et al., citing the American Intellectual Property
Law Association, state that a patent case can cost $1.5 million per
side.80 Only about 5% of cases actually go to trial, with 95% being
settled at some point in the process. 81 In a recent economic
simulation of patent litigation, Graham and Harhoff use a cost of
litigation of $5 million based on estimates from the American
Intellectual Property Law Association.
In light of the evidence, as a benchmark we assume a
litigation rate of 0.3% and a litigation cost of $2 million per case.
The stock of patents is assumed to be one million (which
approximates patents granted in the past five years) and we assume
that half the patent stock is substandard.83 Thus, the approximate
75 Jean Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A
Window on Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON 129, 135 tbl.1 (2001) (counting 16.4
cases per 1000 patents).
76 Allison et al., supra note 39 at 477 fig. 1.
77 Id
78 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963-2008, http://www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/usstat.htm (last visited May 30, 2010).
79 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS'N, 2009 REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 29
(2009); COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, THE CASE FOR REFORM,
http://www.patentfairness.org/pdf/whitepapers/Patents by the numbers.pdf.
80 Allison & Lemley, supra note 71.
81 Fabrizio Cesaroni & Paula Guiri, Intellectual Property Rights and Market
Dynamics (LEM Working Paper Series No. 10, 2005).
82 Graham & Harhoff, supra note 69.
83 On average, a patent is five years old when litigated. Benjamin Hershkowitz,
What Are My Chances? From Idea Through Litigation, FindLaw.com,
http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Oct/16/133092.html (last visited May 30, 2010);
see also Allison et al., supra note 39. Summing over a longer period would
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deadweight loss from the litigation of substandard patents is $3
billion annually.84 While this is also a very large number, it again
remains much smaller than the $21 billion annual cost of research
deterrence.
C. Review of the Evidence
Our analysis shows that the cost of a "loose" patent system
that is prone to grant substandard patents is very high. Much of the
cost is attributable to the reduced innovation, but the administrative
and litigation costs are non-trivial. We estimate that annually, the
deadweight loss from reduced innovation is $21 billion,
administrative costs $1.5 billion, and litigation costs $3 billion.
The total of these deadweight losses that we calculate is $25.5
billion annually. We stress that these estimates are preliminary. As
such, we have provided a range of probable values to demonstrate
the change in estimates given alternative assumptions. Certainly
more research is needed on this very important topic.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of patent policy is to balance the incentive to
invent with the ability of the economy to utilize and incorporate
new inventions and innovations. Because patent law grants de jure
monopolies to patent holders and provides those holders with
substantial rights to prevent infringement or sue for substantial
damages, it is crucial that such patents be awarded only for truly
original innovations. As Justice Kennedy recently wrote,
We build and create by bringing to the tangible and
palpable reality around us new works based on
instinct, simple logic, ordinary inferences,
extraordinary ideas, and sometimes even genius.
These advances, once part of our shared knowledge,
define a new threshold from which innovation starts
once more. And as progress beginning from higher
levels of achievement is expected in the normal
course, the results of ordinary innovation are not the
subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.
Were it otherwise patents might stifle, rather than
promote, the progress of useful arts.
85
increase the estimated litigation costs, so the estimates here might be considered
conservative.
84 The calculation is 0. 50*1000000*0. 003*2000000 = $3 billion.
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